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A coherent method to measure the effectiveness of a monetary policy improves
the monetary authority’s management capacity and renders the possibility of
applying sound policies prior to and during a crisis. The trend in employing
complicated and ambiguity-bearing unconventional monetary tools in the after-
math of the 2008 crisis has increased the value of such a method. The aim of this
article is to introduce a coherent and consistent monetary policy evaluation
method for Turkey. Accordingly, we suggest that innovations in the spread
between overnight interest rates and Treasury auction interest rates are informa-
tive for exchange rate, output, and prices. Empirical evidence for this identifica-
tion reveals that positive innovation in spread (implying a tight monetary policy
measure) decreases output temporarily, permanently decreases prices, and
appreciates local currency. This result is also robust to alternative specifications.
Keywords: monetary policy evaluation; interest rate spreads; business cycles
JEL Classification: E52; E58; E32
I. Introduction
Finding a proper measure and evaluation method for
monetary policy is still among the most tempting pursuits
in the economic literature. Conventional pure monetary
policy suggests that central banks can utilize interest rate
tools by directly adjusting short-term funding rates and by
engaging in open-market operations or regulating reserve
requirement ratios, which in turn affect market liquidity
and long-term interest rates. However, the recessionary
environment of the post-2008 crisis forced central banks
to apply unconventional policy tools that require accom-
modative measures of policy effectiveness. The purpose
of this article is to suggest using the innovations in spread
between overnight interest rates and Treasury auction
interest rates as an indicator of the stance of the Turkish
monetary condition. This variable is informative for
exchange rate, output, and prices.
Drawbacks of conventional measures
Various measures are generally accepted in the literature to
observe monetary policy effectiveness. For instance, sizes
of monetary aggregates, such as M1 or M2, are used as
measures of monetary policy or as measures of liquidity.
However, the relationship between money and income
may not be stable (see, for example, Friedman and
Kuttner, 1992).
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Nonborrowed reserves (NBRs), which measure the dif-
ference between a bank’s total reserves and borrowed
reserves (from the central bank), have been introduced as
a variable that can be more easily controlled than M1 and
M2. However, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) found no
statistically significant empirical evidence that US mone-
tary policy was properly measured by NBRs except for
during the 1979–1982 period.
Interbank or central bank funding rates have also been
frequently used as monetary policy indicators. Even if
their innovation in short-term interest rates well explains
output behaviour, the use of this variable produced
inconsistent estimates on prices and exchange rates com-
pared to expectations (puzzles). In the literature, Laurent
(1988) recognized that short-term rates are under the
influence of the central bank by their manipulative
power over the funding rate. On the other hand, although
funding rate may affect many monetary aggregates, there
is no straightforward reason why the monetary author-
ity’s funding rate intervention should directly affect eco-
nomic activity.
The problem is the interdependence of monetary
aggregates and the real economy bridged by the financial
sector. This situation creates endogeneity for monetary
policy decisions. For this reason, it is not an easy task to
design monetary policy, especially when seeking addi-
tional targets for price stability, such as financial stability.
Even when controlling only for prices, price stability
increases eagerness in the search for yield, and financial
institutions become involved in risky investments
through increasing leverage and currency/maturity mis-
matches. Therefore, distilling the pure effects of mone-
tary policy is quite knotty. Mishkin (2011) noted that
theoretical and practical economists try to impose finan-
cial frictions into general equilibrium models to account
for interdependence. Referring to Johnson (1988),
Woodford (1994) stated that monetary policy alterations
should be transmitted to financial market prices to effect
broader price measures and thus impact the real
economy.
Interbank–Treasury spread as a measure of monetary
policy
In numerous studies, spread notion has been defined to
correlate with different macroeconomic variables. Many
of these studies have taken the spread between short- and
long-term interest rates according to a most reasonable
explanation, which can be summed up as the relative
insensitiveness of longer-term interest rates to monetary
policy. For instance, Laurent (1988) defined spread as the
difference between the 20-year bond rate and the federal
funds rate, while Stock andWatson (1989) defined it as the
difference between 1- and 10-year Treasury bond rates.
Bernanke (1990) suggested various spread definitions,
such as the difference between the long-term Baa credit
rating corporate bond rate and a 10-year Treasury bond
rate or as the difference between the overnight funds rate
and a 10-year Treasury bond rate, and stated that the
commercial paper–Treasury bill spread emerged as the
best predictor. More recently, McCallum (2005) used
one-period and two-period bond interest rates, whereas
Nautz and Offermanns (2008) took the difference between
the Eonia and 3-month Euribor interest rates to measure
the European Central Bank’s monetary policy. Berument
(2007) introduced a slightly different spread definition,
comparing currency depreciation rate with the short-term
interest rate for Turkey.
We introduce the spread between interbank and
Treasury auction rates as a measure of monetary policy.
The interbank rate is a measure of the overnight fund-
ing rate for the financial system and the Treasury auc-
tion rate is a measure of the return on investment in the
long run. We assume that private sector expectations
are based on a comparison of the monetary policy rate
(which is interbank rate here) with the Treasury auction
rate for at least three reasons: (1) the comparison con-
tains enough expected yield information to encompass
most of the available determinants; (2) the bond market
can be complementary and supplementary to other
financial markets, depending on the given economic
conditions, and thus accepted as the financial friction;
and (3) the comparison is simple to observe for policy
makers and market participants alike. All in all,
Treasury yields, especially benchmark bond yields,
affect borrowing costs, which in turn affect level of
investment, equity values, consumption, employment,
and finally, output.
The above explains our Treasury yield choice. Yet there
may be another question: Why do we use the Treasury
auction interest rate but nothing else for Turkey?
First, we cannot use constant maturity interest rates
because the Turkish bond market is not as deep as more-
developed markets such as the US; there is thus no con-
stant maturity benchmark note as employed in similar
studies on the US economy.
Second, we could have taken the benchmark bond
rather than the average of the Treasury auction rates, as
that bond is frequently used in similar studies dealing
with US data. Indeed, there exists a benchmark note in
the Turkish bond market according to which other bonds’
performances can be measured. However, this bench-
mark bond has a shorter maturity and can be changed at
any time with any other bond,1 which raises the problem
1A Treasury bond with a maturity date of 20 February 2013 was the benchmark note at the end of the data time span of this study;
however, while this article was being drafted, the bond was changed to one dated 5 March 2014.
































of volatile maturity. It must also be noted that the
Treasury determines maturity along with interest rate.
As the Treasury changes the benchmark bond, it then
also changes the prevailing interest rate. Eventually, if
we use the benchmark bond with the interbank rate to
obtain the spread, when the Treasury changes the bench-
mark it could be signalling a monetary policy shift when
in fact it is not.
Then the question becomes: Why do we use the
Treasury auction rate if we cannot use the benchmark?
By definition, auction maturity changes in each auc-
tion. Using Turkish Treasury auction data between 1988
and 2004, Berument and Yucel (2005) reported a statis-
tically significant stable negative relationship between
maturity and auction interest rate. Thus, as auction
maturity increases, interest rate decreases. The authors
argued that when the economy faces an adverse shock,
the Treasury is willing to lower the maturity for its
borrowing, and increase the interest rate, rather than
relying on pure interest rates. Otherwise interest rate
would increase too much. Because this relation is stable,
auction interest rate alone captures the credit cost for the
depository institution. Thus, we may use auction interest
rates alone rather than interest rates and maturity
together.
Treasury bond rates are the main interest rates that
derive the asset sides of financial institutions. The key
factor that correlates the central bank funding rate and
auction rate is the amount of government bonds that
financial institutions hold on their balance sheets. The
government bonds-to-total assets ratio of Turkey’s com-
mercial banks’ consolidated balance sheet was 26.4% on
average between 2002:12 and 2011:072; therefore, inter-
est rate gains from the bonds constitute a significant share
in banks’ profits. While auction interest rates in the
primary market are highly correlated with secondary
bonds’ market rates through expected yields, the rates
on banks’ bond holdings directly affect credit and deposit
rates. Moreover, relative movements in funding rates and
capital gains are determinant for private banks to supply
credit to investors and households. Thus, the link
between monetary policy and real economy is bridged,
and henceforth, we define the spread as ‘interbank rate
minus Treasury auction rate.’ A higher overnight rate
relative to auction rate (with all other factors unchanged)
indicates a tighter monetary policy, and because the
central bank provides a lower level of liquidity to the
market compared to what the market accepts, we nor-
mally expect output and prices to decline in the subse-
quent periods.
The spread between overnight rates and Treasury auc-
tion interest rates bunches the cost and return of credit for
the financial system. Figure 1 shows the trajectory of these
two rates for Turkey. Except for a few crisis periods,
Treasury rates have always exceeded the central bank’s
policy rate. Whenever the monetary authority decides to
alter interest rates (by directly shifting the short-term
policy rate or changing the reserve requirement policy)
the depository institutions determine their new positions
by comparing the new interest rate with longer-term credit
facilities.
In Section II, we present the model within the VAR
methodology. We discuss the data in Section III, and in
Section IV we present the empirical evidence and provide
a set of robustness analyses as well as explore major
challenges (i.e., puzzles). We conclude the article in
Section V.
II. Empirical Methodology
In identifying the effects of policies exclusive to a central
bank, it is important to set policy indicators that are largely
insensitive to other variables. To do this, we set up a VAR
model as suggested by Christiano et al. (1999) and the
references cited therein.
The economy is assumed to be in the form of a linear
stochastic dynamic model. Without considering the con-







90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Overnight Treasury Auction
Fig. 1. Interbank overnight interest rates and Treasury
auction interest rates
2Data gathered from Turkey’s Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency’s data base: http://ebulten.bddk.org.tr/AylikBulten/
Gelismis.aspx
































Γ Lð Þy ¼ ε (1)
where the lag operator in the matrix polynomial Γ(L) is
denoted by L, the data vector is denoted by y, and the
vector of interpretable disturbances is shown by ε. It is
assumed that for s > 0, ε(t) and y(t – s) are uncorrelated in
determining the model and data vector. It is also assumed
that the coefficient on L0, which in Γ(L) is Γ0, is non-
singular. In the case that Equation 1 holds, having con-
sidered the stochastic assumptions on ε and y, the matrix
containing the coefficients denoted as B(L) is reduced to
a VAR:
y tð Þ ¼ B Lð Þy tð Þ þ u tð Þ (2)
that is, related to Γ with the following equation:
I  B Lð Þ ¼ Γ10Γ Lð Þ (3)
In addition, the covariance matrix shown as Λ of ε has a





where Γ0 is a nonsingular matrix that is normalized so that
it has ones on the diagonals and shows the contempora-
neous relationships between the variables in the vector y
(t). If no a priori conditions exist on Γ(L), there exist also
no conditions on B(L). Depending on whether other para-
meters are integrated or concentrated out, the likelihood,
which is a function of Γ0 and Λ, is dependent on the data
through S, which is the estimated covariance matrix for u,
that is, the reduced-form residuals. If restrictions exist on
Γ0 that make it identifiable, it is possible to find the flat-
prior posterior mean or mode using a nonlinear maximiza-
tion or integration that depends only on S. If one has tried a
broad range of identification schemes on Γ0, it is not
necessary to apply the identifying restrictions in the for-
mation of S or to restore S. This conceptual structure is
useful because it does not involve any restrictions that
include Γs with s > 0, although the knowledge we have
for Γs for s = 0 is scarce and for any s > 0 it is none. For
now, it is better not to treat our information on Γ0 and Λ,
and carry the informal information on Γs for s > 0. We will
examine the estimated systems where formal identifying
restrictions are put on Γ0 and Γ in the VAR model. One
may also visit Sims and Zha (2006) for further discussion
of this issue.
We make two basic assumptions regarding the model.
First, exchange rate is exogenous for the domestic econ-
omy at a given time period but interacts with other vari-
ables with a lag. This is a reasonable assumption because
Turkey is a small open economy, and thus short-term
capital inflows are the main driver of exchange rates
and move according to the relative conditions of the
rest of the world. Thus, in our monthly data, we assume
the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT)
responds to contemporaneous developments in the
exchange rate, rather than leading it. The period where
the CBRT had depreciated the local currency with a pre-
determined path (or the period that was well predicted by
the market) ended in 2001:03. Therefore, in this period,
the depreciation rate is also pre-determined to spread (see
Berument (2007) for discussion on the issue). Thus, even
if the CBRT was influential in setting the exchange rate
for the pre-2001:03 period, exchange rate would still
precede the spread.
Second, we assume the interest rate spread is exogen-
ous for other macroeconomic variables such as income
and prices at a given period. That is, parallel to Leeper
et al. (1996) and Sims and Zha (2006), innovation in
spread leads to innovation in income and prices rather
than the opposite at a given time. This is a reasonable
assumption because a central bank cannot observe the
real level of prices and output at the time of decision due
to data-gathering trouble, and it is more likely that cur-
rent interest rate affects current output and prices.
However, all variables in the system interact with each
other with a lag.
To identify the system, we need to consider the
identifying restrictions on Γ0 and Λ. Thus, parallel to
Leeper et al. (1996) and Sims and Zha (2006), we
employ the Choleski decomposition and assume that
there is no contemporaneous effect of monetary policy
on disturbances in the general price level or the level
of income. We use this restriction because no contem-
poraneous data exists for these variables when policy
decisions are being made. If we place the monetary
policy variable after the output and prices, we would
have the extreme information that the central bank
knows both variables before they set their policy
actions. If we had been using quarterly data, then we
could assume that the central bank could observe
monthly data within each quarter (or at least the indus-
trial production of the first month and the price levels
of the first 2 months) before they set their policy rate,
and then placing income and prices before the policy
rate would make more sense. One may look at
Christiano et al. (1999) for discussion on this issue.
III. Data
The monthly Treasury auction interest rate is the weighted
average of each auction’s interest rate for the correspond-
ing month, excluding consumer price index (CPI)-linked
































or foreign exchange (FX)-denominated or FX-linked
auctions.3
Industrial production is taken as a measure of income;
CPI is taken as a measure of prices. The exchange rate
(exchange) is the official exchange basket that the CBRT
has been following in its operations: 0.5 USD + 0.5 Euro.4
The interbank rate is the CBRT’s overnight interbank rate.
Money (m) is M2 plus Repo volume. All data are available
from the CBRT’s data delivery system.5
The sample starts in 1988:08 due to data availability
and ends in 2011:07, when the CBRT abandoned over-
night rates as a policy rate and switched to over-week
rates. However, we extend the data span to 2012:07 in a
later stage of the analysis by using the overnight borrow-
ing cost. During the estimation, we include 11 monthly
dummies to account for seasonality and five intercept
dummies to account for financial crises. The intercept
dummies take the value of 1 for the corresponding
month and 0 otherwise.
IV. Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present the results obtained from the set
of VAR models, whose distinctive features comprise
including the additional explanatory variables in the
model (keeping the spread measures in each model) or
the length of the data span. We interpret the impulse
responses of our basic model, where the variables are
ordered as exchange rate (Exchange Rate); the spread
between the overnight interbank interest rate and the
Treasury auction interest rate (spread); industrial produc-
tion (IP) as a measure of income; and CPI as a measure of
prices. All variables enter the system in their logarithms
except for spread. As the Bayesian Information Criteria
suggests, the lag order is 1. To account for seasonality, we
include 11 monthly dummies. To account for financial
crises, we include dummies for 1994:04, 1994:05,
2000:11 2001:02, and 2001:03.
We assess the results and present graphs for the
impulse responses generated by the same models.
Figure 2 displays the estimated impulse responses in
the wake of a contractionary monetary policy, depicted
as a positive innovation in the interbank–Treasury auc-
tion interest rate spread in the macroeconomic variables
considered. We report impulse responses for an 18-
month horizon. The middle line shows the median of
the draws and the other two lines show the confidence
intervals at the 95% level.
Identifying monetary policy within a VAR framework
is challenging. Impulse responses, that is, the time path
of the model’s dependent variables, enclose a set of
well-known puzzles, when there is an exogenous
change in another variable. Two of these puzzles are
closely related to monetary policy stance. Accordingly,
tight monetary policy, measured with a higher interest
rate, may give higher instead of expectedly lower prices
(price puzzle), and eventually depreciate local currency
rather than appreciating it (exchange rate puzzle). One
may visit Kim and Roubini (2000) for a further discus-
sion of these issues. In our specification, a positive
shock to spread decreases (appreciates) exchange rate.
Thus, we do not see the exchange rate puzzle. Second,
the shock to spread persists for 5 months in a statisti-
cally significant fashion. The persistence of monetary
policy is something expected. Output tends to decrease
for 3 months and then return to its initial level.
Eventually, tight monetary policy decreases prices.
Thus, we do not see the price puzzle, either.
Moreover, the decrease in prices is persistent.
Further elaborating on the basic model, we first make a
new specification and end the sample data as of 2011:07.
We do this because on 3 August 2011, the CBRT publicly
declared the over-week rate as its new policy tool, drop-
ping the overnight rate. It also announced that, whenever
it deemed necessary, it might not provide liquidity to the
market on the normally scheduled auction dates. When
an auction was not called, these dates were called ‘excep-
tional days’ and indeed, the CBRT did not fund the
market on those days. Ultimately, there is a cliff between
market overnight and official over-week rates in the
exceptional days’ data. Nevertheless, Fig. 3 shows the
same estimate by replacing the overnight rate after
2011:08 with the effective Interbank Overnight
Funding rate, extending the sample until 2012:07. By
considering the unusual rate divergence on the
3The Treasury opens auctions for various maturities each month. Here, we disregard these different maturities for each auction when we
calculate the Treasury auction interest rate for each month. Therefore, the auction interest rate that we use is a mixture of several ‘forward
rates,’which is implicit in the term structure of interest rates with different maturities. In other words, the auction interest rate variable is a
pooled time series of forward rates with different maturities. Calvo and Guidotti (1992) and Missale and Blanchard (1994) argued that
there is an inverse relationship between auction interest rate and maturities. Empirical evidence from Turkey suggests that this
relationship does exist (see Berument and Yucel, 2005). Therefore, the ‘variable-maturity’ auction interest rate variable that we use is
a monotonic transformation of the ‘constant-maturity’ auction interest rate that one might use to measure fiscal policy, and thus we can
use the (variable-maturity) auction interest rate as an indicator of fiscal policy, as suggested by the envelope theorem.
4The Euro was introduced in 1999. For the period that we do not have data, we use the official convention between the Euro and the
Deutsche Mark (DM) and use the basket as 0.5 USD + 0.974027 DM.
5 http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html
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Fig. 2. Impulse responses to spread between interbank and Treasury auction interest rate shock: 1988:08–2011:07
Note: The middle line shows the impulse responses for 18 periods when a one-SD shock is given to the policy variable; the dotted lines































2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
CPI
Fig. 3. Impulse responses to spread between interbank and Treasury auction interest rates shock: 1988:08–2012:07
Note: The middle line shows the impulse responses for 18 periods when a one-SD shock is given to the policy variable; the dotted lines
are for ±two-SE confidence bands.
































exceptional days, we repeat the above exercise by repla-
cing the funding rate (the official over-week policy rate,
constant at 5.75) with the interbank rate after 2011:08,
but also include an intercept dummy after this date. We
report the results in Fig. 4. The estimates in Figs 4 and 5
are virtually unchanged.
To assess the role and effect on market liquidity
level when there was a change in monetary policy,
we include M2 as an additional variable in our bench-
mark VAR model (see Fig. 5). The higher the spread,
the lower the output for six consecutive periods; this
negative connection is statistically significant for at
least three periods, in consistency with our benchmark
specification. In coherence with the theoretical expec-
tations, the amount of money also decreases, and is
statistically significant for 16 months. A positive inno-
vation of the spread also lowers exchange rate and
decreases prices initially; however, these effects are
not statistically significant.
We use the spread between the interbank rate and
the Treasury auction interest rate as an identification
restriction. It is plausible that both the interbank and
Treasury rates affect economic performance in a non-
parallel fashion; to account for this possibility, we
enter these two variables separately. Figure 6 reports
the corresponding impulse responses. A positive
innovation in interbank rate increases (rather than
decreases) exchange rate; thus the exchange rate puz-
zle exists. Second, a positive interest rate innovation
increases (rather than decreases) prices; thus the price
puzzle also exists. From these results we conclude that
using positive innovations in the interbank rate solely
as a policy tool or as an identifier of monetary policy
tool is problematic.
By considering the CBRT’s dual policy tool that had
been used prior to 2001:03 (i.e., targeting the overnight
interbank interest and exchange rates), Berument (2007)
suggested using the spread between the interbank rate
and the monthly depreciation rate of the Turkish Lira
to identify the monetary policy. Hence, we replaced
Treasury spread with exchange rate spread, and Fig. 7
shows the corresponding impulse responses. Unlike in
our benchmark specification, we do not observe the
exchange rate puzzle but we still see the price puzzle.
In order to account for the liquidity that the CBRT
provides, Berument et al. (2011) employed an analogue
of NBRs, which, unlike the US equivalent, includes the
































2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
CPI
Fig. 4. Impulse responses to spread between the policy rate and Treasury auction rate shock: 1988:08–2012:07
Note: The middle line shows the impulse responses for 18 periods when a one-SD shock is given to the policy variable; the dotted lines
are for ±two-SE confidence bands.
































empirical evidence suggests that the new liquidity mea-
sure (L) is not affected in a statistically significant fashion,
and the impulses for the other variables are robust. The
impulse response analyses for this specification and the
remaining ones are not reported here to save space, but are
available from the authors upon request. Moreover,
Berument et al. (2011) successfully showed that L can
be taken as a measure of monetary policy in Turkey until
2010. Although we lack sufficient observations, we spe-
cify the model with one lag for the post-2010 era. When a
one-SD shock to L is given, not surprisingly most of the
evidence is not statistically significant, but does indicate
that a positive L measure decreases but not increases
prices. Last, we perform the analyses for the post-2002
era, that is, after the 2001 financial crisis. Similar issues
prevail.
VI. Conclusion
This article proposes that innovations in the spread
between the CBRT’s overnight rates and Treasury auction












































2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
M2
Fig. 5. Impulse responses to the spread between interbank rate and Treasury auction rate shock for a five-variable VAR
specification, including M2
Note: The middle line shows the impulse responses for 18 periods when a one-SD shock is given to the policy variable; the dotted lines
are for ±two-SE confidence bands.
































and prices in Turkey. In this manner, while the CBRT’s
overnight interest rate stands for the measure of the fund-
ing rate of the financial system’s assets, the Treasury
auction interest rate denotes a measure that the financial
system can change in its assets in comparison with the
funding rate. Tightness of monetary policy is implied by
the size of the spread. That is, an increase in this measure
can be taken as a measure of higher funding cost and
therefore illiquidity.
The empirical evidence suggests that tight monetary
policy measured by the spread defined herein decreases
output temporarily and permanently appreciates local
currency and decreases prices. This specification also
eliminates the well-known exchange rate and price
puzzles. The empirical evidence is robust for different
specifications formed by including different relevant
variables and for different sample sizes set according to
the possible threshold dates representing radical policy
shifts.
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CPI
Fig. 6. Impulse responses to interest rate shocks
Note: The middle line shows the impulse responses for 18 periods when a one-SD shock is given to the interest rate; the dotted lines are
for ±two-SE confidence bands.
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CPI
Fig. 7. Impulse responses to the spread between interest rate and depreciation spread shocks
Note: The middle line shows the impulse responses for 18 periods when a one-SD shock is given to the policy variable; the dotted lines
are for ±two-SE confidence bands.
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